NOTES ON THE TEACHING OF LEGAL METHOD
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D

uring his first few law school weeks, the beginning law student goes
through an experience for which nothing in his past education has
prepared him. He has been reading books throughout his two, three, or
four college years, but he discovers immediately that the reading of cases
is an entirely different kind of operation. At first he interprets the traditional law school question, "Mr. X, have you read this case ?" as meaning
little more than, "Mr. X, can you tell us in a general way what this dispute was about?" But trial and reprimand soon show him that "Have
you read this case ?" is the law teacher's way of saying, "Are you ready
to discuss intelligently any question I can think of with respect to this
case's out-of-court facts, procedural course, and precedent value?"
Above all, the beginning law student finds it hard to grasp just what
it is that is expected of him, what insights he is supposed to bring to the
class discussion. He gropes for criteria which will enable him to make
a fair guess as to which of the many facts in a case are material facts,
which the professor will insist be included in an acceptable case statement. He sees no unity or pattern in his instructors' demands, because
he has no understanding as to what his instructors are trying to do.
Why did the Professor of Torts, who after all is teaching substantive and
not procedural law, object so bitingly when a member of the class made
the slight error of saying that the defendant had "denied" the complaint
rather than "demurred" to it? What was so grievously wrongabout
stating the issue in an auction case as whether "the acceptance by the
plaintiff highest bidder of the defendant's offer to sell was enough to
make out a binding contract"? Questions like these-underline the continuing insecurity of the first law school semester, a confusion which
reflects principally a lack of comprehension of the postulates and objectives of case-method legal instruction.
In recent years, increasing consideration has been given to the question whether the law school program for the first semester should not include a course intended solely to show beginning law students how to
study legal materials effectively. Strenuous objection to this charitable
design comes from those who believe in Spartan methods of professional initiation. Advocates of a "sink or swim" approach inevitably
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testify that their own mental fibers were toughened in the unaided struggle for comprehension and survival to which they were subjected duringthe first semester of their law study. It may be noted that the affection,
with which the ordeal is remembered tends to increase with the length
of time since the speaker himself left law school, just as the veterans of
World War I recall the good old days of their military service with
vastly more warmth than do the veterans of World War II.
Faculty opinion at most law schools has swung away from the viewthat the confusion of the first law school semester is in itself a desirable
educational experience. The more serious doubts as to the worth of an.
introductory course in the use of legal materials are expressed by thosewho regret the confusion of the first law school semester but believe:
that nothing systematic can be done about it. Is it possible to communicate in a separate method course even a general awareness of the discipline and skills which a law student must bring to bear on case lawand legislative sources? All first-semester courses are really courses
in legal reasoning and method, rather than in the substantive doctrines
of Torts, Contracts, and Procedure. Why is it not better to leave thebeginning student's introduction to professional techniques as the com-mon enterprise of all the first-semester instructors?
The first justification of a separate course in Legal Method is that its,
inclusion in the first-semester, first-year program should accomplish an
appreciable saving of desperately needed law school time. Three law
school years afford insufficient time to bring students to grips with is-'
sues and developments of greai significance in contemporary law practice. Law teachers and law students agree that the existing law school
course fails to give anything like adequate training in such essential'
professional skills as counselling, negotiation, and drafting and, even,
more important, takes insufficient account of the responsibility of law- yers as participants in the making of public and private policy decisions.
How can a suitable consideration of these crucial issues, skills, and values.
be added to the already over-packed law school curriculum? One pos.sibility is to forego the luxury of having all four or five first-semester
courses taught as if they were all principally courses in the fundamentals
of case reading and analysis.
But time is not the only, nor even the chief, consideration. An even
more important gain is that a reasonably well-taught course in the
fundamentals of professional method can liberate the other first-year
teachers from routine chores and enable them to conduct their class.
discussions in specific subjects like Torts and Contracts on a higher plane
of criticism and artistry. The effective presentation of a first-semester
course in a fundamental legal subject requires rare qualities of resource-.
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fulness and imagination. There are never more than a few real artists
at classroom teaching on any law school faculty. It is as wasteful of
talent to have a great case-method teacher spend his limited time in Contracts on a painstaking presentation of the mechanics of reading cases
and statutes as it would be if an art school were to require Orozco or
Sloan to instruct beginners in canvas stretching or if a department of
English were to assign Housman or Thornton Wilder to the teaching
of Composition I-A.
Dowling, Patterson, and Powell's Materials for Legal Method
is the
latest effort to design a casebook for the specific purpose of introducing
beginning law students to the approaches and skills necessary to the rewarding study of case and statute law. It would be pointless for me to
-undertake an extended review of a casebook as well known to law
teachers as is the Dowling, Patterson, and Powell collection. In their
preface, and in the explanatory notes with which they introduce each
chapter, the three editors are quite explicit as to their general objective
and as to their reasons for thinking the materials in each chapter will
-contribute to the beginning law student's understanding and perspective.
Widespread agreement that the casebook is a suitable teaching tool for
the purpose at hand appears from the fact that the casebook is already
in use at more than fifty law schools, although its first publication was
in the spring of 1946.
This, then, is one law teacher's account of the major problems which
'he has encountered so far in the teaching of Legal Method. Most of
the observations offered should apply to any introductory course in the
-materials and methods of the profession, whether taught from the Dowling, Patterson, and Powell casebook or from some other set of materials of the instructor's own development or choice. Whatever the
-teaching materials, the students in any Legal Method .class will all be
'beginners in the law. And the basic legal sources to which these beginners are to be introduced will be the same: the opinions of judges
.and the enactments of legislatures.
II
Every entering law class is made up of students of superior college
:achievement. The instructor will do a great deal to help the members
-of the class get their bearings in the new surroundings if he can suggest
-lines of correlation between their past college work and their law school
.studies. The construction of this bridge from the familiar to the new
-might not be too difficult if all members of the class had completed anything like a uniform pre-legal program. As matters stand, there is not
-asingle ingredient of essential background knowledge which the instruc-

JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION

(VOL. I

tor in Legal Method can take for granted. One student in five will
have studied English constitutional history, and he will know little, if
anything, concerning the development of English legal institutions.Everyone in the class will have a general familiarity with economic theory, but few will be aware of the elementary facts of life about ordinary
business practices and procedures. And most beginning students enter
law school with no grasp of the course of American economic and political history, without which the corresponding developments in legal doctrine are largely unintelligible.
These notes on the teaching of Legal Method are not the place for a
presentation of the case for a standard pre-legal program. But the plain
fact is that the greatest single difficulty in the management of the first
few Legal Method class discussions is that the typical first-semester,
first-year law class possesses nothing even remotely approaching a common body of knowledge and experience. It is not necessary here to
contend that certain specified college courses are necessarily preferable
to other courses as pre-legal training. I have certain strong convictions
about the matter, as, for example, that a college graduate with a backgi-ound of stiff training in logic and in physics or chemistry is better
equipped to begin the study of law than a student never subjected to
those disciplines. But my present point is the narrower one that there
is no common denominator at all.
Every teacher knows that the most effective device in the introduction of a beginner to a new discipline is the use of the analogy to some
familiar area of the beginner's experience. If the students in a typical
Legal Method course shared any field of common knowledge-whether
it be classics, biology, or the history of art-analogies to that field might
be used to illumine introductory discussions of lawyers' problems and
shorten the long jump from college to law school. If, for example, all
members of the class had an elementary knowledge of physics, a crossreference to the concept of "vectors" 2 would do much to sharpen student
comprehension of what is involved in the process which law professors
call the synthesis of decisions. As it is, references to baseball and football are about the only useful analogies I have been able to arrive at in
three terms of teaching Legal Method.
I A three-point course in Development of Legal Institutions is required of firstsession law students at Columbia. Since that course gives a thorough grounding In
the history of the common law and its institutions, the instructor In Legal Method
can put his full emphasis on introducing students to legal skills. At schools which
have no course corresponding to Development of Legal Institutions, the teacher of
Legal Method has a harder job and wider responsibilities than this article may
suggest.
2 See AIBERT EINSTEIN AND LEOPOLD IxFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF Pirrscs 12-19
(1938).
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The circumstance that all his students are beginners creates a second,
quite different, problem for the teacher of Legal Method. A beginning
law student finds it difficult to follow a legal explanation, but he asks
harder and more searching questions than will any of the old hands.
The thinking of first-semester, first-year law students follows no established grooves and takes none of the conventions of the profession for
granted. The freshness of outlook which beginning law students have,
simply because they are beginners, makes it impossible to predict the
questions which will be raised by the members of the class during an
hour's discussion in Legal Method. By the time a law teacher is halfway through a course in Legal Method he will have been forced to reexamine and prepare a reasoned reply to fundamental questions concerning our legal order about which he may not have thought since his
own early law school days.
The wide-ranging nature of beginning student inquiry was brought
home to me the first time I taught Legal Method. We had worked
through a line of cases, and I moved on to make the point that a lawyer's
construction of the bearing of the precedents just considered on a future, slightly different, case would depend very largely on whether he is
acting in the later case as counsellor, advocate, or judge.' As law professors do, I stated a hypothetical case and asked successive members of
the class to formulate the strongest possible argument which could be
made by counsel for the hypothetical plaintiff on the basis of the casebook precedents. The discussion had not gone very far when one of
the best men in the class raised the direct question whether it is right for
a lawyer to urge a court to accept a proposition of law which the lawyer
himself is not convinced represents a fair construction of the available
precedents. Needless to say, I tried to dodge the question by quoting
from the casebook that "the permissible limits of advocacy are not dealt
with here." ' But the class would not let me evade it, and I think now
that they were right. Certainly it is irresponsible to introduce beginning
students to the technique of legal argument without at the same time
discussing candidly and at length the role of the advocate in the administration of justice.
This experience, and many others like it, have convinced me that one
indispensable addition to a course in Legal Method is at least an elementary consideration of the legal profession as an institution and of the
obligations and responsibilities of members of"the bar. In the preface
3 This point is excellently made in the brief text section entitled "The Uses of
Legal Argument" on pages 471-472 of the Dowling, Patterson, and Powell casebook.
4 At page 471. My quotation, of course, was out of context, as the chapter from
which it was taken is expressly described as concerned only with the formal logical
analysis of cases.
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to his Cases and Other Materials on the Legal Profession, Professor
Cheatham states it as one of his principal objectives "to foster the development of a sense of professional responsibility, which may result
in effective and decent representation of clients and, at the same time,
in aid in the readjustment of the profession to the changing needs of
society." ' Progress towards. this objective cannot be postponed until
the second or third law school year. Legal techniques become more
meaningful when viewed in the institutional and ethical environment
of their use. A law student will never again be as receptive towards a
candid discussion of the responsibilities and problems of the profession
as he is during the first semester of his first law school year.

Much of the confusion of the first law school semester can be traced
to student uncertainty concerning the assumptions and the objectives of
case-method legal instruction. Why should first-year law study proceed
by way of the laborious fashioning of legal rules from the raw materials of past judicial decisions rather than by the systematic exposition
of general legal principles with cases mentioned only for illustrative purposes? Unless the beginning law student can be made to see why we are
using the case method, what attributes and skills we want him to develop in the course of this slow and sometimes tedious process, he will
remain in doubt as to what is expected of him when he is called on to
take part in class discussions and will miss the point and purpose of the
best classroom presentation.
The beginning student's introduction to the study of case law should
be so planned as to make clear to him at the outset that the case method
is not an arbitrary arrangement of legal materials to suit academic preconceptions, but an approach to the study of law which is dictated by
the essential nature of the materials which lawyers must make use of in
the performance of practical professional tasks. The basic assumption
,of the case fiaethod is, I take it, that the case method requires the law
student to use legal sources in a manner which resembles as closely as
possible the use which lawyers make of the same sources in courts and
law offices. A clear statement of the assumptions and aims of casemethod law teaching will do more to put a beginning student on the
right track in his study and discussion of case law than can any other
form of introductory explanation.
Chapter II of the Dowling, Patterson, and Powell casebook, entitled
"The Reading of a Case," constitutes the editors' answer to the ques5At page vi.
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tion: "What does .the law student most need at the very beginning of
the study of law to help him read [cases] effectively?" The first thirtysix pages of this chapter contain information intended to acquaint beginning law students with past and present forms of judicial organization and with the mechanics of law reporting. The chapter's final forty
pages are designed to communicate what the editors call "the beginning
of an understanding" of the determinative control of procedure on the
effect and scope of a judicial decision.
Comprehension of the extent to which the procedure in a case controls the breadth of the proposition of substantive law for which the
case can be taken as authority is the unfailing mark which distinguishes
professional from amateur case analysis. The difference which results
from procedural awareness 'stands out particularly in courses like Constitutional Law and Trade Regulation, in which the class roster may include both law students and graduate students in political science or
economics. A mediocre law student will excel the best graduate-school
man when they meet on the law student's home ground of case analysis.
However intelligent the graduate student may be, and however well
versed in his own field of specialization, it is impossible for him to read
an appellate court opinion for what it is-the court's justification for
its decision of an issue of law framed by the pleadings and procedural
moves in the court below.
For use in helping beginning students to acquire a reasonable measure
of procedure-mindedness, the editors of the Legal Method casebook
have included a seven-page text note from Scott and Simpson's Caseson Judicial Remedies, outlining the course of proceedings in a legal action, and eight cases presentirig a cross-section of procedural devices:
demurrer, answer, judgment n.o.v., motion for directed verdict, -and
motion for a new trial. The difficult teaching p-oblem at this stage of
Legal Method is that most beginning students are so fascinated by the'
new terminology, and by procedure for procedure's sake, that they fQrget.
the whole purpose of the discussion.
Patient explanation and frequent repetition are necessary to make
clear to a beginning law student that the eight procedural cases are being
brought to his attention during his first week in law school not for the
purpose of giving him an advance synopsis of Civil Procedure but for
the sole purpose of explaining to him why every decision of so-called
substantive law must be examined through procedural spectacles. Nowhere else in the course is there as much danger that the beginning student will miss the forest for the trees.
The teacher of Legal Method will, I think, find it necessary to impose a rigid and seemingly arbitrary limit on class discussion of these

JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION

[VOL. 1

procedural cases. The only teaching device I have .found effective is
to introduce this part of the course with the dogmatic statement that
we are going to examine each of the eight cases in the casebook with two,
and only two, questions in mind: (1) Is this decision a final adjudication of the rights and duties of the parties before the court? and (2)
What, if any, is the proposition of substantive law for which this case
can be taken as authority? My experience is that even this restriction on
discussion will not permit a pace faster than two cases a day if the beginning student is to grasp and retain "the beginning of an understanding" of the importance of procedure in the analysis of case precedents.
What are the other irreducible minimum insights which must be developed before a beginning student is equipped to start the effective study
of case law? First, and perhaps foremost, he must learn to approach
cases with two clear questions in mind: (1) What considerations caused
the court to arrive at the decision which it handed down in this case?
and (2) What influence is this case likely to have on the thinking of the
judges before whom somewhat similar cases will come for decision in
the future? Obvious as this point will seem in later courses, it is the
sharpest departure from the approach which the beginning student probably found sufficient in his undergraduate studies, where it was not often
necessary for him to go beyond the attainment of an understanding of
past events.
In introducing students to case-law processes, I have found it helpful
to proceed by way of three separate stages in classroom emphasis. In
the first stage, the class spends an hour on each of two or three cases,
and the discussion does not go beyond a painstaking analysis of why
the court in each case decided the controversy as it did. The three
cases set out in the Dowling, Patterson, and Powell materials under the
heading, "Judicial Behavior When Faced With a New Problem," lend
themselves very well to the kind of clinical dissection which characterizes this first stage in the discussion of case law.
After the members of the class have shown that they have at least a
general idea of all that is involved in taking a case apart, the discussion
moves on to the second stage. Cases are still discussed one by one, but
the emphasis shifts to a consideration of each case's weight as a precedent in later cases involving somewhat different out-of-court facts.
Here the beginner meets for the first time the ever-present professional
problem of determining how much of the talk in a judicial opinion was
"holding" and how much is to be stigmatized as dictum. The justification for simplifying the problem by narrowing the issue to one of the
weight of a single case precedent on a single new set of facts is that we
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are bringing a complete novice to grips with a problem of case analysis
for which Anglo-American law has never arrived at a formula solution.
How much can the teacher of Legal Method do with the holding.dctum idea? His first responsibility is to make sure that the members
(f the class grasp the crucial significance in common-law thinking of the
xistence of a conceptual distinction between the holding, or ratio decilendi, of a case and the doctrinal statements in the opinion which later
fudges will, or may if they choose, disregard or discount as dictum. The
irst-year law student begins to understand the profound respect for
facts which characterizes the common-law tradition only when he has
learned that the weight of a judicial decision as precedent in a later case
depends more on the similarity of the facts of the two cases than on the
doctrinal generalization stated in the first court's opinion.
Legal Method class discussions of the holding-dictum problem should
go far enough to advise the beginning law student that the common law
knows no scientific formula whereby a legal analyst can determine precisely in every case what statements in the opinion are holding and what
statements are dictum.' The student of case law might as well find out
immediately that the use of case law is an art and not a science and that
the distinction between holding and dictum is like the distinction between night and day, easy to discern at the opposites but a matter of
shading in morning and twilight areas. On this essential phase of legal
analysis the course in Legal Method can do no more than communicate
an introductory awareness of why cases must always be analyzed with
the holding-dictum distinction in mind and a further recognition of the
subtlety with which a good case lawyer handles the problem. The disciplined and continuing practice necessary to develop the beginning student's own skill and artistry in the application of the holding-dictum
standard can be provided only in the other first-year courses.
In the third and mbst advanced stage of the Legal Method student's
introduction to the study of case law he has his first try at the challenging intellectual operation which the editors of the casebook call the
synthesis of decisions. The specific materials selected for study and discussion are the cases which have developed and are developing the law
concerning the liability of sellers and manufacturers of goods. Here
again the function of the course in Legal Method is limited to setting the
stage for the continuing practice in the synthesis of decisions which the
student will receive in his other courses. Eight or nine hours of class
6 The best effort to state an analytical formula is probably Goodhart, Determining
the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L. J. 161 (1930). But judicial practice is
much more realistically described in Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J.
71 (1928), and Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in our Case-Law of Conltract, 47 YAL
L.J. 1243 (1938).
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discussion of the problems of synthesis set by the manufacturers' liability cases can.hardly do more than warn the beginning law student of the
great variety of the factual differences and doctrinal trends of which
he must take account in the formulation of a reasonable and useful synthesis of a line of decisions. Legal Method has done its job if the firstyear law student can recognize a masterly job of synthesis when he meets
one in later class discussions in Torts, Contracts, and Procedure.
Since Legal Method, is instrumental to better student performance in
other courses, the teacher of Legal Method is worried all the way by a
time schedule which has to be fixed in relation to the student's rate of
progress in other subjects. Undoubtedly it will occur to him that he can
save time by making it clear to the class at the start that the course in
Legal Method is concerned with the formal rather than the material
validity of legal reasoning and that no attempt will be made in Legal
Method to consider the extent to which judicial decisions are explainable
or predictable in terms of non-doctrinal considerations.
My limiting formula, the first time I taught Legal Method, was that
my approach would be the same as that of a professor of surgery, who
restricts himself to operating techniques and does not attempt to teach
the class'how to determine whether the man on the operating table is a
useful citizen or a scoundrel whom the world would be better rid of.
The falsity of this analogy is apparent. If the surgeon's technique is
skillful, the patient's moral shortcomings will not affect the success of
the operation. But the best legal technique will not save a case if the
deciding court is convinced that the case lacks substantial merit. The
method of the common law demands the effective use both of doctrinal
arguments and of those non-doctrinal arguments which we call appeals
to justice or policy. The realities of professional technique require that
it b6 made clear even to beginning students that precedents rarely impose
so tight a rein on the discretion of judges that they are forced to decide
cases unjustly.
IV
Chapter VI of the Dowling, Patterson, and Powell casebook is given
to cases and notes on the interpretation of statutes. Chapter VII introduces beginning students to selected problems in the coordination of
judge-made and statute law. At many law schools as much as one-half
of the classroom time assigned to Legal Method is given to coverage
of these two statute-law chapters. The probable explanation for this
emphasis is that other first-semester courses are usually taught almost
entirely as case-law subjects, and Legal Method is looked upon as the
only course in which first-semester, first-year law students are given
systematic instruction in the use of statutes. The strong legislative
1 JOUI1AL OF LEGAL ED.NO.1
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weighting of Legal Method as actually offered throughout the country
would appear to justify the following rather lengthy statement of certain
of the principal teaching problems involved in introducing students to
professional method in the use of statute law.
By far the hardest point to get across to beginning law students is a
decent respect for the language of statutes. After even a few weeks of
case-law analysis and synthesis, a first-year law student has discovered
that the principle of law derived from a case or from a line of cases can
be stated in several different forms of language, each of which constitutes an accurate statement. But a statutory rule of law is cast in an
exclusive textual form.' The beginning law student finds it extremely
difficult, as for that matter do many members of the profession, to work
comfortably with a legal principle of which there is only one authorized
version. Inevitably the beginner wants to handle statutes with the same
freedom of paraphrase which he has found permissible in the statement
of case-law principles.
My experience with three different Legal Method classes is that it
takes three or four full class hours to convince first-session students
that the issue in a case of statutory interpretation must be so stated as
to include an exact quotation of the precise term of the statute with
respect to which the question of statutory applicability arises. The beginning law student shies away from this discipline as a colt from the
saddle, and he resists professorial insistence that issues of statutory interpretation be stated with textual precision more stubbornly than he
fights against anything else in the course.
The teaching problem here outlined is a familiar one to every law
teacher who has undertaken to introduce law students to the use of statutory materials. Assume, for example, that the instructor has called
for a statement of the issue in the familiar case of McBoyle v. United
States.8 Inevitably the student to whom the question is addressed will
give an answer approximating: "The issue in this case is whether the
interstate transportation of a stolen airplane is to be considered a federal
offense under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919." I have
discussed the McBoyle case with five different sets of first-year law students, and I have yet to encounter a student able to reply, without a refresher glance at his casebook, that the precise statutory term before the
7 "Case law is made up of the propositions of law which acquire authoritative

status because they are inferred from judicial or administrative precedents ... ;
the propositions of law thus derived are not reduced to an official exclusive textual
form. Legislation, on the other hand, is reduced to an official exclusive textual

form."

DOWL-G, PATTERSON, A-ND

POWELL, IMIATERIALS F R LEGAL METHOD 15

(1946).
8283 U.S. 25, 51 Sup.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931); DOWLU-G, PATTERSON,
ELL, MATERLkLS FOn LEGAL METHOD 2-84

(1946).
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Supreme Court for interpretation was the term "motor vehicle," which
the Act itself further defined as including "an automobile, automobile
truck

.

.

or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for run-

ning on rails." Without this focusing of the issue on the crucial term
of the statute itself, the student, of course, misses the entire point of the
controversy.
First-year law students see legal issues and concepts in extremes of
black and white. If a beginning student has read a case or two, or a law
review article, indicating that courts in appropriate cases can usually
find ways to go behind or beyond the supposed "plain meaning" of a
statute, he is impelled at once to the conclusion that the words of a statute are of no consequence whatever. The only device that will provide
reasonable insurance against general student adoption of this uncritical
attitude is to spend the first two or three hours of class discussion of this
part of Legal Method on hypothetical cases to be analyzed and discussed
solely on the basis of the words of a given statute. Next fall I am going
to go so far as to tell the members of the class that they are not even to
look at any judicial decisions interpreting statutes until they have learned
that the first indispensable step in the analysis of a statutory problem is
the reading and rereading of the text of the statute itself.9 Unless this
simple but fundamental lesson is hammered home, the student is left
unequipped to perform workmanlike statutory analysis and wholly unable to appreciate the niceties of legislative drafting.
Once the beginner has learned to state an issue of statutory interpretation in a form which takes sufficient account of the precise term of
the statute with respect to which the issue of interpretation arises, he is
qualified to proceed to analysis of judicial theory and judicial practice in
the resolution of statutory doubts. There will be no disagreement, I
think, as to the fundamental point we want the beginning law student
to grasp and retain. This basic point is that the traditional formula that
courts are bound to apply the "intention -of the legislature" means simply
in most cases that the court should decide doubtful questions of statutory applicability in such a way as will best contribute to the attainment
of the objectives which the legislature sought to accomplish by the enactment of the statute.
Here again we meet the problem of uncritical student extremism.
How can a collective body have an intelligible "intention"? Even if a
9 1 suppose I had better say that I still adhere to the views on statutory Interpretation I expressed in The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsio Aids in the Inter.
pretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WAsu. U.L.Q. 2 (1939), and Statutory Doubts and
Legislative Intention, 40 CoL.L.REV. 957 (1940). But I wish my students would not
read the Plain Meaning article during the first week of Legal Method class discussion of statutory construction.
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collective "intention" is possible, how can there be anything like a legislative will with respect to issues of interpretation which no member of
the legislature ever thought of when the statute was passed? When
such questions arise for discussion, beginning students are inclined to
move to the easy conclusion that all judicial doctrines of statutory construction are hocus-pocus and that the wise judge should simply resolve
statutory ambiguities in the manner which best suits his, the judge's,
personal views as to justice and expediency.
The best teaching materials for use in communicating to law students
an awareness that the purposive interpretation of statutes means interpretation in the light of the judgments and values which were compelling
to the enacting legislators, and not in the light of the judge's own personal preferences, are the cases in which courts have given great weight
to committee reports and other legislative sources in the construction of
acts of Congress. At first glance the statutory-interpretation chapter of
the Legal Method casebook seems overloaded with these so-called "extrinsic aid" cases,'" since the technique involved is not applicable in the
interpretation of state statutes, where extrinsic aids are practically never
available. But no other cases can be used as effectively to help beginning
law students acquire a realistic understanding of the appropriate responsibilities of legislatures and courts in the development and application
of the statute law. Other Legal Method teachers with whom I have
discussed the matter agree that the emphasis on extrinsic-aids cases is a
sound one in a first course on statutes and that the statutory-interpretation chapter of the casebook is stimulating and teachable.
One serious handicap in Legal Method class discussions of statutory
interpretation is that many beginning law students have no knowledge
whatever of federal and state legislative organization and only the haziest notions concerning the essential characteristics of the modem legislative process. Issues involving the weight to be given to a Senate committee report in the interpretation of a federal statute can hardly be
grasped realistically by a student who has no idea of the extent to which
Congressional government operates through the committee system. A
poll of beginning law students at any law school would reveal a general
student idea of Congress as a disorderly debating society in which little
attention is given to such details as the technical articulation of statutory
provisions. The term "legislative committee," to the average first-year
law student, calls up principally headlines about the Thomas Committee,
-and few students have any idea of the expertness which an experienced
standing committee of Congress brings to its consideration of the tech10 "Extrinsic aids" figure, or are mentioned, in nine of the seventeen cases in
Chapter VI, "Interpretation of Statutes."
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nical phases of bills referred to it for judgment and development. In
my own Legal Meihod classes, I have found it necessary to preface class
discussions of statutory-interpretation problems with painfully elementary comments on legislative organization and functioning, particularly
with respect to the committee system and the role of the executive in the
formulation and sponsoring of legislative proposals."'
V
How should the course in Legal Method be fitted into the first-semester, first-year time schedule? At Columbia the work in Legal Method is
concentrated in the first part of the semester by having the class meet
five times a week for five weeks, three times weekly for the next four
weeks, and once a week for the last five weeks. Theoretically, this arrangement is subject to the criticism that an introductory course in the
essential skills of law study should be offered and completed before the
entering student begins any other class work at all. But there are not
many law teachers whose eriergies and imaginations are sufficient to enable them to carry so concentrated a load. I know that I could not meet
any class, beginners or graduates, fifteen hours a week for three weeks
without completely deadening student interest. The device of adding
variety to a steady diet of Legal Method by dividing the course among
three or four members of the faculty seems undesirable in an introductory subject in which careful organization and systematic references
back to materials already covered are necessary to the student's progress.
The more important practical justification for some such compromise
schedule arrangement as exists at Columbia is that the value of a course
in Legal Method is not as clear to the first-semester law student as it
will be to him later. Even the best of our recruits come to law school
fired with eagerness to learn "the law" and skeptical towards a course
which does not pretend to communicate knowledge of any body of legal
doctrine. The beginning law student's frame of mind is about that of
an apprentice carpenter, eager to get going on the building of things
and impatient with attempts to give him systematic grounding in the
use of his tools. His attitude changes very quickly after he has skinned
his knuckles and blackened his thumbnail a time or two. There is much
keener student awareness of the need and function of Legal Method
after disastrous experience in other courses has shown the beginners how
ZLThe best reference for outside reading by law students beginning the study of

statutory interpretation is JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN, LEGISLATIVE PIROCESSES: NATIONAL AND STATE (1936), particularly the description of the work of committees II
Chapter VI. And Legal Method students can usefully be referred to the sprightly,
words-and-pictures account of how a bill becomes a law in GEeoer, H. E. SMITH A.ND
FLOYD M. RIDDICI, CONGRESS IN ACTION (1948).
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much they have to learn about the tools of legal analysis before they
can do anything constructive with a nice problem in Contracts, Torts, or
Civil Procedure. It should be added that the materials on the formal
logical analysis of judicial precedents in Chapter IX of the Dowling,
Patterson, and Powell casebook can be presented far more effectively
as providing a critical apparatus to be brought to bear on the work of
an entire law school semester than if they were covered at the end of the
student's third law school week.
Questions as to when Legal Method is to be taught are trivial when
compared with questions as to how it is to be taught. My own views
as to the preferable classroom approach are controlled by my conceptions
of the functions which the course fulfills in the first-semester law school
program: the creation of some understanding of the assumptions and
objectives of the case method, and the communication to beginning
students of a respectful awareness of the discipline and skills which a
lawyer must bring to his use of case and statute law. The development
of the student's own artistry in the use of the techniques of the profession can be accomplished only through the repeated and disciplined experience in case analysis and synthesis, and in the use of statutes, which
he will secure in his other courses.
The accomplishment of this limited but difficult objective requires the
taking of pains more than it requires the flash of genius. The hiddenball trick and the fake reverse are not for the teacher of Legal Method;
he is there to clarify and explain. Legal Method sets the stage for the
more sophisticated performances of the other law school courses. If this
is objected to as the acceptance of too lowly an office, we have always
George Herbert's assurance:
Who sweeps a room, as for Thy laws
Makes that and th' action fine.

